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The first appreciable industrialization and urbanization process in parts of Europe can 
be dated to the 19
th century. Technological progress was necessary to produce sufficient 
agricultural crops allowing people to concentrate and human activity to specialize: while in 
Europe the share of urban population increased from 20% in 1850, to 52% in 1950 and nowa-
days to 75%, in the united states a rise form 3% in 1800 to over 60% in 1950 and 77 % in the 
last years was observed (Fujita and Thisse 2002). The urbanization process was accompanied 
by a relatively constant pattern of different sizes of cities and economic areas and their spatial 
distribution.
1 Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) show for the United States that in 1991 40 
cities had a population share of more than one million, 20 cities of more than two millions and 
9 cities, Houston in Texas was a little bit to small, of more than four million people. The 
respective population share living in urban centers relatively to the total population is quite 
low (e.g. New York ca. 7%) and lately declining. 
On the contrary, the economic and urban development in nearly whole Latin America and 
Asia did not start until the last century. In the majority of these countries, economic activity is 
concentrated to few agglomerations absorbing a huge part of the total population and attract-
ing more and more labor force from structurally backward regions as Mexico City in Latin 
America or Manila in Asia for example. As a result, there are core regions of industrial and 
urban activities, which can hardly be destabilized by the tightening negative social, ecological 
and economical impact. A distribution and/or size rule of urban cities as mentioned for 
Europe and the USA is not to be found in the developing countries. 
How can the coexistence of these different patterns of industrialization and urbanization be 
explained? Can regional policies such as different trade policies or fiscal measures account for 
regional inequalities or do we have to rely on comparative cost advantages? 
While the impact of pursing different trade policies reaching from import substitution to trade 
liberalization on developing countries’ economic development and prosperity is widely stud-
ied
2, trade policies cannot explain the existence of uneven urbanization and industrialization. 
As described, economic activity in Latin America as well as in Asia concentrates on huge 
agglomerations although the pursing of trade policies was quite different for a long period in 
the last century. 
                                                 
1 To what extend cities in its turn are specialized or diversified is discussed by Duranton and Puga (2000, 2001a, 
2001b). 
2  See Elizondo and Krugman (1995) as well as Puga and Venables (1998, 1999). 
  2Indeed, developing countries do have an incentive to use fiscal policy to foster industrializa-
tion and to attract mobile factors by offering favorable conditions such as low taxes. It is 
widely believed that further economic integration such as the intended creation of a free trade 
area for all American countries or the enlargement of the EU to 25 countries in May 2004 
leads to painful adjustment processes within the core and periphery countries. Without tax 
harmonization for example, mobile factors will locate to regions where taxes are low and/or 
the provision of public goods is high. Hence, periphery countries may decrease their tax rates 
leading to an inward flow of mobile factors and pushing local economic development at the 
cores’ expense. As a result, all countries would adopt the same tax rates leading to “a race to 
the bottom” and to a sub-optimal provision of public goods as predicted by the standard tax 
competition literature (Wilson 1999). Increasing tax competition as a result of further eco-
nomic integration is more likely to give way for a tax harmonization than to account for the 
asymmetric formation and development of industrial agglomeration.  
Moreover, none of the traditional neoclassical models are able to give a satisfactory answer: 
These kinds of models try to explain asymmetric industrialization and international labor 
division by a set of comparative cost advantages due to factor distribution and resource allo-
cation as well as constant returns of scale. Using comparative cost advantages as a main 
source for regional specialization, the loss or the abolition of them should lead to a disintegra-
tion of these concentrations: in the beginning of the 20
th century all of the ten biggest cities in 
the USA emerged as seaports. Although the importance of water transport has permanently 
depleted, most of them remained important, see Fujita and Mori (1996) and Krugman (1993). 
Therefore, neoclassical models cannot explain persistent development of industrial and urban 
concentration characterized by uneven pay of factors and regional inequalities. 
Hence, in order to deal with uneven economic development and to create the possibility for 
the periphery to catch up with the core, it is not enough to rest on trade policy, fiscal measures 
and comparative cost advantages. It seems to be more fruitful to have a closer look on the cost 
of spatial interaction, increasing returns, inter-industrial linkages, different labor supplies and 
research activity when discussing industrial and urban concentrations. 
In the last century developing countries were confronted with a higher degree of scale econo-
mies, lower transaction and communication costs and a higher elasticity of rural population 
towards urban migration than in the 19
th century when industrialization and urbanization 
began in Europe and the USA.
3 The increased profitability of firms due to mass production, 
the reduction of transportation cost as well as a massive rural exodus can be used as an expla-
                                                 
3 Puga (1998) shows in a two-region-model the development of urban concentrations due to interregional migra-
tion and points to the importance of a high elasticity of labor supply for the urbanization of developing countries. 
  3nation of the emergence of huge industrial und urban agglomerations in the developing coun-
tries serving international markets.  
In fact, the processes leading to urban and industrial concentrations are the same for all coun-
tries: technological progress, closer networking of industrial activities, diminishing transport 
and communication costs and a higher labor pool due to international migration increase the 
incentives to spatial and economic concentration. Circular processes arise leading to core 
regions with a high share of urban and industrial activities, where economic development 
fosters further prosperity, and to structurally backward regions. Therefore, differences in the 
degree of these effects seem to have a major impact on industrialization and might be the 
reason for distinctive industrialization patterns. 
 
The structure of the paper is described as follows. In the next section basic intuition and some 
stylized facts about industrial agglomerations, research activity and tax competition will be 
given. Section 3 presents a two-country model. Section 4 shows and discusses the impacts on 
steady state equilibria when analyzing research activity and international migration. Adding 
strategic tax-setting and introducing a limited tax game enriches the story in section 5. A 
summary of the paper and an outlook are stated in section 6. Further equations and equilib-
rium conditions as well as specific details for parameters and the numeric simulation are listed 
in the appendix. 
 
2. Agglomeration, Research Activity and Tax Competition 
 
When talking about agglomerations and their lock-in-effects, one inevitably comes 
across the concept of Marshallian externalities (Marshall (1890)): mass production, the avail-
ability of specialized input services and the formation of highly skilled labor as well as the 
production of new ideas are crucial in the formation of industrial clusters (Fujita and Thisse 
(2002)). These effects are decisive for cumulative agglomeration processes to take place even 
when considering strategic tax competition. 
 
Agglomeration 
The interaction of economies of scale, costs of transportation and migration are deci-
sive for the location of industry. With reference to Hirschmann (1958) there are pull and push 
forces leading to core periphery structure or even pattern of industrialization: manufacturing 
firms are able to use intermediate goods more cheaply and face a greater demand towards 
  4their products where other firms and consumers are concentrated (cost and demand linkages). 
Further agglomeration will occur. At the same time competition in product and factor markets 
rises with the number of locally operating firms. These neoclassical forces work against ag-
glomeration and the emergence of core periphery structures. Therefore the pattern of industri-
alization and urbanization depends on the one hand on the presence and on the strength of 
these pull and push forces. On the other hand the role of migration is considered to have a 
strong impact on the formation of agglomeration. While sectoral migration is a major factor 
for intraregional firm location, interregional migration affects the country as a whole. Both 
types of migration will be taken into account and differences in either nominal or real wage 
rates are entailed by higher fluctuation of labor. The effects on agglomeration and economic 
development are distinctive: manufacturing firms can attract a higher share of labor force 
from other sectors by offering a higher nominal wage rate pushing further industrial agglom-
eration. If this leads to a widening of interregional wage gaps, which is not responded by 
factor movement due to migration restriction, firms may consider a production outsourcing to 
the structurally backward region/country and weaken industrial concentration. If not or in the 
case of free factor movement, agglomeration is even more encouraged as seen in many core 
cities in developing countries. 
 
Research Activity  
Another source that pushes industrial agglomeration and fuels economic development 
is R&D-activity as the main cause of technological change and productivity growth. In gen-
eral, innovation rates are higher and positively influenced in industrialized regions with high 
levels of research activity leading to faster economic development than in structurally back-
ward regions. Hence, if the outcome of R&D is determined largely by skilled labor, then the 
cutback of the restrictions on factor mobility is decisive. The higher education system, com-
plemented by immigration of highly skilled labor from abroad, might be an important indica-
tor questioning the attractiveness of regions, OECD (2003).
4  
Factor mobility in multi-regional growth and agglomeration models as modeled by Walz 
(1996), Black and Henderson (1999), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) or Martin and Ottaviano 
(2001) are mostly analyzed dynamically: following the endogenous growth theory of Romer 
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) permanent product innovation in the R&D sector 
                                                 
4 Comparing the higher education system in the OECD countries for example, the flows of university graduates 
are higher in the European Union than in the United States: while the EU award 36% of science and engineering 
(S&E) university degrees of all S&E degrees given by the OECD countries in 2000, the USA account for only 
24%. Considering Ph.D. degrees in S&E, the gap even widens: 50% in the EU and 27% in the USA, OECD 
(2003). This underlines the importance of the EU as an attractive region for immigration. 
  5will lead to a higher number of products and firms and hence to higher endogenous growth 
rates.
5 In static context the treatment of R&D is distinctive but leads to the same results: 
research outcome will reduce costs on a firm level and will augment the number of locally 
operating firms and products leading to higher economic development. Depending on whether 
there is fundamental or secondary research (Aghion and Howitt (1998)), the implications on 
firm costs have to be modeled differently. 
Average Production Costs: 
Fundamental research as measured solely by R&D outcome is supposed to reduce fix costs on 
a firm level and hence the average production costs due to its long term character. The likely 
result is a lower break-even-point for settled firms and a higher market entry of competitors. 
Referring to an empirical study about costs and productivity in the automobile production 
from Fuss and Waverman (1992), the impact from technical change, measured as stock of 
R&D
6, to the average unit production costs would have been for the U.S. -0.8%, for Japan -
2.7% and for Canada -0.3% per annum over a period of 1970-84 and for Germany -1.1% per 
annum for 1970-80. 
Total Factor Productivity 
The same study shows an increase of total factor productivity, measured as a ratio of output to 
aggregate inputs, of 1.3% for U.S., 3.0% for Japan and 1.3% for Canada per annum over a 
period of 1970-84 and for Germany 1.3% per annum for 1970-80. Following Fuss and Wa-
verman (1992) this increase can be attributed to R&D, to scale economies and capacity utili-
zation. Leading to a higher productivity of input factors, secondary research interpreted as 
learning-by-doing should consider the implication of R&D results as well as quality and 
process improvements due to a high share of manufacturing production. Therefore, the impact 
of secondary research is supposed to be on variable costs leading to a cost reduction on a firm 
level. 
Moreover, the implementation of research results and its impact on agglomerations depends to 
a great extent on the kind of technological spillover. Following Martin and Ottaviano (1997), 
there is a distinction between local and global spillover effects of R&D implementation. On 
the one hand, the availability and applicability of research outcomes can be restricted locally: 
blueprints cannot be transferred and applied to other regions due to their specific use or prop-
erty rights, strengthening the inequality between regions even further. But on the other hand, 
                                                 
5 In the case of Black and Henderson (1999) human capital accumulation and knowledge spillover as mentioned 
in Lucas (1998) fuels urban growth. 
6 It is constructed by converting annual R&D expenditure to a real capital stock. Fuss and Waverman (1992) set 
a benchmark R&D stock for 1967 and normalized it to one arguing that the then available technology for Ger-
many and Japan could be represented by the R&D stock in the U.S.A. 
  6reengineering and/or imitation of imported products or increased interchange of human capital 
and ideas can raise the degree of interregional research spillovers and therefore the likelihood 
for economic prosperity of developing countries. Hence, a crucial role is accredited to techno-
logical spillover effects while analyzing economic development. 
 
Tax Competition 
Considering the impacts of tax competition on international mobile factors and ag-
glomeration, one raises the question: does national tax policy push economic prosperity and 
does it lead to a higher share of industrial production by controlling international mobile 
factor flows? While capital moves to regions where taxes are low and risk adjusted profits are 
high, the migration decision of labor takes account of taxes, wages and provision of public 
goods among others. The mentioned “race to the bottom” result of the standard tax competi-
tion literature does only apply to mobile capital and in a perfect competition and constant 
return modeling. Indeed, things are different in models of the new economic geography
7 
and/or with labor as the mobile taxable factor (Borck and Pflüger (2004), Anderson and 
Forslid (1999)). For skilled labor to migrate, countries may have to raise, not to lower tax 
rates in order to account for a higher public good provision or to offer higher wage proposals. 
Tax competition may then yield to an outcome with sub-optimal tax rates, which are too high 
from a social perspective. Again, tax harmonization will be taken into account. Furthermore, 
if skilled labor is largely employed in research activity, the effect on R&D and its impact on 
firms have to be considered as well. 
 
3. A Static Equilibrium Model 
 
The model is based on a microeconomic funded theory, which relies on the concept of 
monopolistic competition from Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the adapta-
tion on regional economics from Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Krugman and Venables 
(1995). In addition, the use of intermediate goods in the manufacturing sector is considered. 
This is in line with the models among others like Venables (1996), Fujita, Krugman und 
Venables (1999) as well as Fujita and Thisse (2002).
8 Costs of spatial interaction are modeled 
as iceberg costs, Samuelson (1954). There will be a publicly financed R&D sector providing 
fundamental research to firms and reducing costs on a firm level: this impact will augment the 
                                                 
7 Krugman and Baldwin (2004) show first “a race to the top” and then “to the bottom” as economic integration 
goes further. 
8 A good overview of the theoretical treatments on regional economics is given by Grafts and Venables (2001). 
The empirical stand is shown in Overman, Redding and Venables (2001). 
  7number of locally operating firms and therefore the supply of goods. Leading to similar re-
sults, a learning-by-doing approach is introduced to incorporate the effects of a higher re-
gional share of manufacturing labor on economic development. To keep it analytically tracta-
ble, both approaches will be examined separately due to its impacts on economic 
developments and compared to a model without regional research activity as formalized in 
Puga (1999). Due to the assumption of increasing scale returns and the consideration of re-
search activity and its spillover effects on industries, monetary and technological external 
effects as mentioned by Scitovsky (1954) can be analyzed within one framework. Preferences 
of consumers are expressed by a love-of-variety assumption. In order to analyze strategic tax-
setting and to introduce a limited tax game in section 5, the model follows Baldwin et al. 
(2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
 
3.1. Model Structure 
 
  Let us consider a world with two economies i = 1,2, with identical endowments of 
mobile and immobile factors of production. Considering the mobile factors, there will be a 
distinction between unqualified and qualified workers   and  , where the first are mobile 
between sectors within an economy, the second between the two economies. The shares of the 
immobile factors land   and capital   will be the same in each country and will be fixed. 
Both countries have the same technology and firms are able to engage in both agriculture and 
manufacture. Within the manufacturing sector, intermediate goods will be needed for indus-
trial production. Gross country trade with industrial goods will be subject to transportation 
costs. In addition, there will be state financed research and development in each country. The 
research results will have an impact on either fixed or variable costs on a firm level. All con-
sumers have the same preferences and are time indifferent. 
i L i m
i B i K
Steady state equilibria will be considered. Further development of equations and equilibrium 
conditions are shown in the appendix. 
 
Agriculture 
In the agricultural sector, s = R, there is perfect competition and constant economies of 
scale. The homogenous agricultural good   can be traded without transportation cost. The 
production is supposed to take the form of a Cobb-Douglas production function using land   
i y
i B
  8and unqualified labor   as input factors:  , with  R i L ,
) 1 (
, , , ) , (
θ θ − = B L B L F R i i R i R i θ  as the partial 
production elasticity of unqualified labor and   = B.  i B
The nominal wage rate paid in the agricultural sector will be obtained by the first derivation 
with respect to unqualified labor: 
) 1 ( 1
, ,
'
, , ) , (
θ θ θ
− − = = B L B L F w R i R i R i R i .       ( 1 )  
Considering that unqualified workers can be employed by the agricultural sector as well as the 
manufacturing sector, equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
    ,    (1.1) 
) 1 ( 1
, ,
'
, ) ( ) , (
θ θ θ
− − − = − = B L L B L L F w U i i U i i R i
with   as unqualified labor employed in the industrial sector. If there is a constant share of 
 in economy i, the agricultural payoff will be determined solely by the industrial factor 
demand: the higher the share of labor in manufacturing, the higher the productivity and there-
fore the payoff in the agricultural sector. A profit condition
9 can be used to express agricul-
tural gains as a function of the price of the agricultural good  , nominal wages   and 
land endowment B: 
U i L ,
i L
R i p , R i w ,
    { } ) , ( max ) , , ( , , , , , , B L g y zaB L w y p B w p R R i i R i R i i R i R i R i i ≤ − − = , (2) 
where   is the cost for agricultural land use. Equation (2) can be rewritten using  =1 to:   za R i p ,
) ( ) , , 1 ( , , R i i R i i w Br B w R = ,       (2.1) 
with   as maximized profit per unit land.  ) ( ,R i i w r
 
Manufacture 
In the industrial sector, s = U, we assume monopolistic competition and increasing re-
turns of scale. Input factors for the industrial goods are an aggregate of intermediate goods 
, with a production share of  i CES µ , and unqualified labor  , with  U i L , ( ) µ − 1 :  
µ µ
i U i i CES L Q
− =
1
, ,         ( 2 )  




















1 0 ≤ < ρ  and i = 1,2. The aggregate supply is therefore a 
Cobb-Douglas and a CES production function with ρ  as a degree of product differentiation 
and   as the number of firms operating in economy i.  i N
                                                 
9 See Puga (1999). 
  9It is convenient for the analysis of cost distribution and price setting to argue on microeco-
nomic levels. The cost function as an optimizing result of cost minimizing for an individual 
firm in country i can be written as:  
( ) ( ) k x w q k C i i i U i i i β α
µ µ + =
− 1
, ) ( ,       ( 3 )  
with   as the price index and   as the nominal wage rate paid in the industrial sector. The 
cost of producing industrial goods can be divided into a fix part 
i q U i w ,
i α  and a variable part  i β
10, 
where   is the output of firm k in country i. Increasing returns of scale are responsible for 
firms to produce a single, heterogeneous product in the steady state equilibrium. So   also 
stands for the produced amount of good k in country i. 
() k xi
() k xi
Due to the assumption of monopolistic competition, firms are price setter and are therefore 
able to raise prices above marginal cost, but have to compete in markets. Price setting leads 
to: 







i w q p ,         ( 4 )  
with ( ρ / 1 ) as a constant mark-up factor. The short term profits of a firm determined by free 
entry in markets are calculated as: 








π ) ( ) ,        ( 5 )  
with  σ  >1 as the elasticity of substitution between goods and   as the 
break-even-output. In the long run profits are zero. The elasticity of substitution is assumed to 
be identical in both countries. 
i i
bep
i x β σ α / ) 1 ( − =
 
Government: Research Activity and Taxation 
The public R&D-sector, s = F, operates under the assumption of constant economies 
of scale. Qualified labor   and a constant capital stock   are used as input factors in the 
R&D sector. For a Cobb-Douglas production function we get: 
i m i K
ι ι − =
1 & i i i K Am D R ,         ( 6 )  
with ι  as the partial supply elasticity of qualified work and A as a constant technical parame-
ter. The research output   in equation (6) will be available to firms in country i without 
charging a fee. 
i D R&
                                                 
10 Picard and Thisse (2002) presume that production occur solely under the consideration of variable cost and 
underscore the assumption of monopolistic competition as an essential push factor towards agglomeration. 
  10To finance the R&D-sector in economy i, a lump sum tax  i a τ  on taxable income and there-
fore on consumption is imposed: 
i i H i i i rkK m w Y a + = , τ ,       ( 7 )  
where   is the nominal wage rate for qualified work in country i and   is a global con-
stant interest rate. Hence, equation (7) states, that there is a resource transfer from immobile 
factors, who have to carry the tax burden, to factors employed in the R&D sector. 
H i w , rk
 
a.) Fundamental Research: R&D 
The research level in country i is solely determined by the output of the R&D-sector. 
Depending on the availability of non-locally research, each country accounts with:  
j i i D R D R FE & & Γ + = ,        ( 8 )  
for  j i ≠ . The spillover effect is best expressed by  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ Γ : a global spillover effect  1 = Γ  
means, that both countries transfer research from each other without loosing application and 
redundancy. By   country’s research level is determined by its own research activity. As 
mentioned before, fundamental research will reduce fixed cost on the industry level:  
0 = Γ
i i FE / 1 = α .          ( 9 )  
 
b.) Secondary Research: Learning-By-Doing 
  Both the R&D-sector and the labor participation in the manufacturing sector   is 
considered by a learning-by-doing approach in order to determine the secondary research 
level in country i: 
U i L ,
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j i i D R D R ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ Γ  measures the availability and 
redundancy of non-locally research. Equation (8.1) determines the level of the variable cost: 
i i FE / 1 = β .          ( 9 . 1 )  
 
Representative Consumer 
The representative consumer is supposed to have a time invariant, identical preference 
towards goods produced in both countries. The utility is described by a love-of-variety prefer-
ence: the higher the number of goods, the higher the utility. Preferences therefore are best 
  11described by a Cobb-Douglas function using the agricultural numéraire good,  , and an 
aggregate of industrial consumer goods  . The aggregate itself is a CES function of the 
heterogeneous goods:  
1 = i y
i VU
γ γ
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− =
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γ  as the consumption share of the industrial products. The 
degree of product differentiation ρ  will be identical for both regions. The first order condi-
tion yields to the indirect utility function:  
* ) 1 ( 1 i i i Y q V
γ γ − − − = ,         ( 1 1 )  
where   is the available income after taxation. The price index for the industrial 
products   is the same for consumers and producers due to analytical reasons. 
i i Y a Y ) 1 (
* τ − =
i q
 
In addition to the optimization rule in equation (11), there is a migration condition for skilled 
workers:  
* *
j j i i Y q Y q
γ γ − − = ,         ( 1 2 )  
for  j i ≠ . Equation (12) changes, if the decision for migration depends on real wage rate 
differences: 
    .                     (12.1)  H j j H i i w q w q , ,
γ γ − − =
 
3.2. General Equilibrium Conditions 
 
Due to the assumption of increasing economies of scale, each good is produced by a 
single firm located in one region. Total demand of one good will be composed of consumer 
and producer demand from both countries. Demand allocation for good z on both aggregates, 
 and  , in economy i is therefore:   i VU i CES
( )
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
σ σ σ σ τ
− − − − + = j j i i i i q e q e z p z x ,     (13) 
for  i j ≠ . Iceberg transportation costs have to be considered, while doing interregional trade: 
only a fraction of goods produced in country j and requested in country i will be met by local 
demand. Parts of the traded quantity melt away, i.e. units ( 1 ≥ j τ ) in region j shrink to one 
unit in region i.   is the producer price of the firms and will be listed as the free-on- ) (z pi
  12board price (FOB). The price index for the bundle of industrial goods in country i can be 
written as:  
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for  i j ≠ . In each country the price index depends on local prices, which on their part depend 
on FOB-prices and local transportation costs. The total expenditure   is composed of the 
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The first part of equation (15) stands for the net expenditure of the consumers, while the 
second part describes the share of firms’ cost spending. 
The remaining part of cost spending  ) 1 ( µ −  will be dispended towards labor demand. Ac-
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Qualified labor demand can be calculated using equation (7) and aggregated total income, 
. Rearrangement leads to:  ∫
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Steady-State Equilibrium  
Both economies are characterized by an initial equilibrium. Exogenous shocks such as 
diminishing transport costs will lead to transition phases, where regions and sectors are 
marked by fluctuation of firms and labor. As mentioned by Puga (1999), the adjustment proc-
ess can be stated as:  
 
                                                 
11 Due to the lump-sum taxation of consumer income in order to finance R&D input factors, equation (15) 
reduces to:  ; see appendix part c).  dh h C dh h Br L w e
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for i=1,2, with   und  as the derivatives for the quantity of firms and skilled labor with 
respect to the adjustment time while reaching a steady state equilibrium, 
i n & i m &
1 λ und  2 λ  as positive 
constants and   as well as   as static variables. The share of unskilled labor in the manu-
facturing and agricultural sector is determined by industrial demand and will not be quoted as 
an explicit adjustment process. 
i n i m
For a steady state equilibrium to occur, it is necessary that there is no incentive for further 
outsourcing of production and migration. Therefore both countries have a static share of firms 
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for i=1,2. 
From equation (20) follows that in a steady state equilibrium firms are not able to make prof-
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The number of firms in country i will be endogenously determined by equation (16): 
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The model and the equilibrium conditions are described by equations (1) to (22). 
 
4. Equilibrium Analysis: Economic Development and Agglomeration 
 
Results of the static equilibrium model will now be presented and discussed. After in-
troducing exogenous shocks, i.e. diminishing transport cost, to the model, equilibrium condi-
tions and steady state equilibria will be analyzed. In particular, there is a range of transport 
cost values, where either a symmetric or asymmetric distribution of industrial activity as a 
stable equilibrium results. The procedure follows the one discussed by Fujita, Krugman und 
Venables (1999) and is best described by answering two questions: (1) When and under 
which conditions is an asymmetric dispersion of economic activity a stable equilibrium? (2) 
When and under which conditions is a symmetric equilibrium dissolved towards agglomera-
  14tion? Answering the first question does not mean that an agglomeration outcome emerges. In 
fact, there are transport costs, where both types of industrial distribution can arise.
12 However, 
there is a logical sequence of industrialization: starting from an initial symmetric equilibrium, 
there is a single determined transport cost value from which a symmetric equilibrium switches 
to the formation of industrial clusters and structurally backward regions.
13  
To keep things simple, governments will not engage in strategic tax-stetting in order to influ-
ence the course of industrialization. Therefore, input factors in the R&D sector are supposed 
to be paid either by their marginal product or by a constant rate. Normalizing the capital stock 
to one, factor payment for skilled labor will be   and for capital rk. Hence, this 
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4.1. Fundamental Research: R&D 
 
We consider an initial equilibrium with an identical distribution of input factors. Both 
countries are characterized by equal industrial and research activity subject to high transport 
cost,  3 = τ . Spillover effect of research is supposed to be same in both regions and measured 
by  : 50% of regional research is not applicable or redundant. While figure 1 shows the 
share of industrial activity, 
5 , 0 = Γ
) /( j i i i n n n s + =  for  j i ≠ , figure 2 presents the total number of 
firms  . In order to compare, the results of a numeric simulation of a model without R&D 













    Figure  1:  Shares  of  Industries 
                                                 
12 Generally known as a Tomahawk-bifurcation: the graphical presentation looks like a prehistorically tomahawk 
(Fujita, Krugman und Venables (1999)), see figure F1 in appendix f). 
13 In the course of advanced industrialization (i.e further decline of transport costs) a restructuring of industrial 
production and therefore a higher share of economic activity in the periphery can result. The respective transport 
cost value can be calculated by stating that an asymmetric equilibrium remains stable as long as there is no 
incentive of firms to relocate production. 
14 This value corresponds to a static equilibrium model without interregional migration presented and discussed 












    Figure  2:  Number  of  Firms 
Diminishing transport costs may lead to an interference of the equilibrium in both countries. 
However, if transport costs are high, the symmetric equilibrium remains stable. Neoclassical 
forces as push forces in to factor and price markets are strong enough to predominate the 
mentioned agglomeration forces (cost and demand linkages): it is not profitable for firms to 
cluster when delivering markets in the periphery is too costly. Moreover, no incentive for 
industrial concentration will be given due to equal research activity in both countries. As a 
result, the initial distribution of input factors and the symmetric equilibrium remain un-
changed, while there is a slight increase in the number of firms in both countries due to a 
lower price index
15, see figure 2. 
Further diminishing of transport cost leads inevitably to a dislocation of industrial production 
and to a grouping of research activity: in core regions intermediate goods can be now used 
less costly as input factors, equation (3) in combination with equation (13), and firms face a 
higher demand for industrial products, equation (15). These cost and demand linkages are 
strong enough to dissolve the symmetric equilibrium leading to a concentration of industrial 
activity and to a migration of skilled labor in country 1. Reaching a critical value for the 
transport cost  76 , 1 = krit τ
16, the symmetric equilibrium breaks down in favor of an asymmetric 
distribution in country 1. The transition phase is characterized by erratic dislocation of total 
industrial activity
17. In contrast to a model without R&D, industrialization will occur earlier 
and is characterized by a higher number of firms and products both during the transition and 
the agglomeration phase, figure 2. Two niveau effects have to be mentioned: firstly, there is 
an agglomeration effect due to increasing returns of scale on industry level which lead to a 
                                                 
15 From equation (22) follows that when factor input remains constant the number of firms increase as the price 
index falls. Economically argued, a lower price index leads to a cheaper use of intermediate goods in industrial 
production and to short run profits. Due to the fact that in long run profits are zero and the break-even-output is 
unchanged, there is a higher number of firms. 
16 Corresponds to the value generated by numerical simulation. 
17 In Principle, the process of industrialization can be gradual and discontinuous. In Puga (1999) the third deriva-
tion of the profit function with respect to regional shares is responsible for the course of industrialization. 
  16higher number of firms. Secondly, as a result of inward migration of skilled, a regional group-
ing of research leads to a comparative cost advantage and therefore to a higher incentive for 
agglomeration, hence to a higher share of industrial activity. 
The additional unskilled labor demand of firms in country 1 will be met by offering higher 
wages leading to sectoral migration. The contrary happens in country 2: due to the loss of 
industry shares and the assumption of full employment, the labor force release in the indus-
trial sector have to be absorbed by the agricultural sector pushing nominal wage rates down, 
equation (1.1). Hence, the resulting gap in nominal wages reinforces agglomeration in country 
1 through a higher expenditure share, equation (15). In figure 3.a) and 3.b) nominal and real 
wages of unskilled labor are shown. 
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      Figure 3: Wage Rates: Unskilled Labor 
The nominal wage gap does not change during the agglomeration phase because further at-
traction of unskilled labor by the manufacturing sector is not possible.
18 However, there is an 
improvement in the real wage rate in country 2, see figure 3.b), and a shrinking of the real 
wage gap: only the price index in the periphery is affected by a further reduction of transport 
cost. Imported goods subject to transport cost are getting cheaper leading to a lower price 
index and therefore to a raise of the real wage rate in country 2. 
Sectoral and interregional migration will lead to a convergence of wages in both countries. 
While nominal wage rates for unqualified labor are equalized through sectoral fluctuation 
within countries, the migration condition, equation (12.1), leads to a convergence of real 
wages for qualified labor between countries. 
As mentioned, the uneven development of the regional price indices during the first stages of 
industrialization opens a real wage gap. International migration of skilled labor occurs and 
                                                 
18 The maximal share of unqualified labor employed in the manufacturing sector, without affecting primary 
supply with agricultural goods and therefore individual utility, depends on the consumer share of agricultural 
goods γ  and the elasticity of unqualified work θ  in the agricultural sector, see appendix part d). 
  17augments the participation in the R&D sector in country 1. Hence, a higher degree of research 
activity lowers fix costs on firm level and generates short run profits for settled and potential 
firms. Due to free market entry assumption, this yields to a even higher number of firms in 
country 1 and to cumulative processes. The transition phase toward an asymmetric equilib-
rium is characterized by a ongoing migration flow of skilled labor and an increasing share of 
research activity in country 1 fostering further economic development and concentration. 
Nominal as well as real wage rates are presented for skilled labor in figure 4.a) and 4.b). 
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      Figure 4: Wage Rates: Skilled Labor 
An interesting point to mention is the contrary development of nominal wages of skilled labor 
due to the economic development, see figure 4.a): a higher research activity in the industrial-
ized country is accompanied by a lower productivity and hence a lower wage rate. In the case 
of the United States, Segerstrom (1998) shows in an empirical survey covering a time period 
from 1965 to 1989 a constant patent rate registration even though there has been a labor in-
crease in R&D by half a million. Segerstrom (1998) outlines the fact that research results are 
increasingly harder to obtain and therefore outputs stagnate despite enormous efforts. In 
accordance with this view the decreasing productivity and the lower wages can be explained. 
Due to the migration condition, equation (12.1), the real wages rates in both countries do not 
diverge, figure 4b). Further agglomeration yields to a gradual increase of skilled work and 
hence nominal wages in country 2 by means of the asymmetric development of the price 
indices. As a result, the number of firms is reduced - lower research activity decreases com-
parative cost advantage - but the asymmetric agglomeration remains stable, see figure 2. 
The share of research activity depends on the economic development: the higher the share of 
industrial production and manufactured goods, the lower the price index and the higher the 
incentive for skilled labor to migrate.
19 A grouping of research activities in one country itself 
                                                 
19 Alonso-Villar (2002) introduces an „education market“ to increase the share of skilled work in agglomera-
tions.  
  18has a positive impact on economic development due to cost leverage effects. Thus industriali-
zation and the supply of R&D results cause each other and yield to economic development. 
 
Proposition 1: Industrial agglomeration and economic development reinforce each 
other: there are circular processes leading to a core-periphery structure. 
 
Impact of Spillover Effects on Economic Development 












      Figure 5: Spillover Effect: Number of Firms in Country 1 
Dependent on to the degree of regional spillover effects of R&D results,  , there are 
distinctive agglomeration processes: high degrees of spillover effects decelerate industrializa-
tion because both countries benefit in the same way from a higher access to research results. 
Regional comparative cost advantages due to restricted applicability are losing their impor-
tance for promoting local agglomeration.
20  
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ Γ
 
Proposition 2: The higher the degree of spillover effects in R&D, the more industrial 
agglomeration is delayed: the regional importance of research activity as a pull force 
towards regional industrialization vanishes with increasing international access and 
applicability of research. 
 
                                                 
20 The derivation of the critical transport cost value due to Γ  should be negative,  0 / < Γ ∂ ∂ krit τ . The identical 
value for the critical transport cost,  76 , 1 = krit τ , for  5 , 0 = Γ  and  7 , 0 = Γ  is a matter of the chosen number of 
iteration steps and parameters in the numerical simulation. 
  19However, agglomeration and economic development are characterized by a higher number of 
firms, the stronger the spillover effects are: the highest niveau effect of economic develop-
ment can be notified by a global spillover effect,  1 = Γ .
21 
 
Proposition 3: Economic development depends positively on regional research activi-
ties and on their spillover effects. 
 
4.2. Secondary Research: Learning-By-Doing  
 
Considering learning-by-doing and assuming the same initial conditions as well as a 
spillover effect of  5 , 0 = Γ  for both countries as discussed above, the impact on industrial 
agglomeration and economic development is the same. In fact, there will be an additional 
agglomeration impulse when considering the share of unqualified labor in manufacturing. An 
earlier formation of agglomeration as result of a higher industrial and research activity in the 
manufacturing and R&D sector can be observed. The divergence of nominal wage rates re-
spectively to unskilled and skilled labor in figure 6.a) and 6.b) represents the formation of the 
core periphery structure. 
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  Figure  6:  Nominal  Wage  Rates: Unskilled and Skilled Labor 
The circular process leading to industrial agglomeration and uneven economic development 
starts earlier and with higher amplitudes with regard to the number of firms and products than 
in the case of fundamental research. As described, this leads to higher sectoral and interna-
tional migration opening up nominal wage gaps. Hence, an increase of total factor productiv-
ity as a result of a higher share of industrial and research participation in the core region 
seems to be a major pull force. 
                                                 
21 In the course of further concentration, agglomeration and the number of firms are less affected the higher the 
spillover effect and therefore the lower the impact of R&D relocation is due to the asymmetric change of the 
price indexes. 
  20 
Proposition 4: Increase of total factor productivity fosters industrial agglomeration 
and economic development leading to a higher number of firms and a higher research 
level. 
 
Impact of Spillover Effects on Economic Development 
In Figure 7 effects of different spillover effects on the formation of asymmetric equi-
libria are given. As mentioned in the case of fundamental research and expressed in proposi-













      Figure 7: Spillover Effect; Industry Shares 
Interestingly, for a spillover effect of  1 = Γ  there is an additional critical value of transport 
cost from which a symmetric distribution reappears. This finding corresponds to figure 1. In 
contrast, for   and   the resulting lock-in-effects are too strong to destabilize a 
once established agglomeration. 
5 , 0 = Γ 7 , 0 = Γ
 
5. Government Taxation and Tax Competition 
 
  Now we consider a more active role for state activity to foster local industrial agglom-
eration and to promote national economic development. In the last section government taxa-
tion was limited to raise lump sum taxes in order to finance research activity: qualified labor 
was paid by its marginal product while the factor payment for capital was held constant. At 
any time there was a well balanced state budget and no strategic effect on industrial 
agglomeration had to be considered. 
Countries may now raise their taxes on income in order to attract mobile factors from abroad 
by offering higher factor payments. A greater inflow of skilled labor in the R&D sector will 
increase national R&D and hence - by free market entry - the number of settled firms. There-
  21fore, a strategic tax policy can foster economic development and yield to higher industry 
shares. 
 
This section is organized as follows: after a further specification of the government objective 
function and its tax policies, we analyze separately the two kinds of equilibria, which we 
discussed throughout section 4, and rest solely on fundamental research activity, equation (8) 
and (9). In the case of a symmetric equilibrium, states are not primarily interested in changing 
their status quo: governments maximize their utility function by choosing an optimal tax rate 
either in a cooperative or non-cooperative way. In a core periphery situation, the structurally 
backward country may have an incentive to reverse the industrialization process and to snatch 
industry shares from the core country by setting a strategic tax rate. In order to anticipate this 
possibility by the core country, a limited tax game will be introduced and analyzed. 
 
Government Objective Function 
  As before, the government uses its inland revenue due to lump sum income taxes, 
i iY a τ , to finance research activity in the R&D-sector,  i i H i rkK m w + , . Within a country, an 
income tax raise and its redistribution as factor payments do not change the total factor in-
come.
22 However, there is an income transfer towards international mobile factors at the 
immobile factors’ expense.
23 Hence, government decision making in choosing the right tax 
rate is ambivalent. On the one hand, governments have to consider that individual utility is 
obviously reduced by imposing taxes. On the other hand, a higher tax revenue and its use for 
the provision of public goods (i.e. higher research activity) favors at first glance qualified 
labor, but also the country as a whole through a higher number of locally operating firms and 
cheaper products. 
 
The utility function for the government can therefore be stated as:      
    ,        ( 2 3 )  
i i
i i i i i C G C G WE
ψ ψ − =
1 ) ,
for i=1,2 and with  i i i i q Y a G / τ =  as provision of public goods,  i i i i q Y a C / ) 1 ( τ − =  as con-
sumption of a representative consumer after taxation and  i ψ  as a public good preference in 
country i. Rearranging equation (23) leads to: 
                                                 
22 It is supposed, that international mobile factors spent their income and getting taxed in the country, where they 
are employed (origin principle in tax theory). So there are no factors repatriating earnings and GDP and GNP do 
not differ in this model, see Baldwin et al. (2003). 
23 Due to the assumption of a constant capital stock as well as a unchanging interest rate, capital factor income 
does not alter and a higher tax revenue is only redistributed to qualified labor. 
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Migration Condition  
With reference to the migration decision of qualified labor, the migration condition, 
equation (12), can be rewritten as: 
1
) )( 1 (
















.                     (12.2) 
Qualified labor takes into account taxes, the price level and individual factor income. Bearing 
in mind that factor income for qualified labor is the nominal wage rate financed through lump 
sump taxation,  , and   is stated as aggregated income in 
country i ,  , equation (12.2) can be trans-
formed to: 
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Optimal Tax Rate-Setting  
Following Baldwin et al. (2003), one way to find the optimal tax rate for a symmetric 
outcome is first to assume that all factors are immobile (i.e. migration condition equation (12) 
does not apply) and to calculate the first best tax rate. Afterwards, factor mobility will be 
allowed in order to show whether the result does change or not. 
To start with, the term   in equation (23) is a parameter and does not vary with differ-
ent tax rates. It is then easy to derive from equation (23) that the first best tax rate is  : 
the tax rate to set in order to finance the public good provision equals the preference for that 
good. 
) / ( i i q Y
i i a ψ τ =
*
Asserting that the first best tax rate is a symmetric equilibrium, preference for the public good 
therefore has to be the same in both countries,  ψ ψ ψ = = 2 1 . The next step is to allow for 
                                                 
24 Note that GDP consists only of the factor income of unqualified labor,  , and the short run 
profits,  : factor income of qualified labor and capital financed through income taxation does not count. 
) ( , , R i i U i w Br L w +
∫
∈ i N h
i dh h) ( π
  23factor mobility, equation (12.3). If country 1 does not want to deviate from the first best solu-
tion nor does country 2,   would be a symmetric Nash equilibrium with an equal share 
of mobile factors, 
ψ τ =
* a
2 / 1 2 1 = = m m . However, if one country has an incentive to deviate by 
setting a higher tax rate in order to obtain a higher share of mobile factors and to raise the 
number of firms and goods, the first best solution cannot be a Nash equilibrium. In this case 
we rely upon numerical simulations. 
 
To see if the first best solution is a Nash equilibrium, the government utility function has to be 
mechanically differentiated. Equation (23.1) can be facilitated by using two sub-functions,  
( )
ψ ψ τ τ τ
− − =
1 ) 1 ( ] [ a a a f  and  ) / ( ] [ q Y m g = , and dropping country indexes: 
] [ ] [ a f m g WE τ = . Total differentiation and evaluation of the derivative at the first best tax rate 
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Due to the optimal tax rate, the first term in equation (24) is zero. Hence, the sign of 
a d dWE τ /  depends only on the second term. Using the definition of Y one gets by application 
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at the supposed symmetric equilibrium. 
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All other things constant, a higher tax rate leads to an increase of qualified labor due to the 
migration condition. Hence, an increase in skilled labor increases the number of firms and 
therefore decreases the agricultural profit share per unit land and the price index. Finally, the 
elasticity of skilled wages with respect to skilled labor is negative.
25 The negative effect of the 
agricultural profit rate does not overweight the other effects due to a tax increase. As a result, 
                                                 
25 For further discussion see appendix e). 
  24a d q Y d τ / ) / (  is positive and therefore  a d dWE τ /  as well: countries have an incentive to 
deviate from the first best solution by raising higher tax rates in order to get a higher utility. 
Hence, the symmetric first best solution is not a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Indeed, numerical simulation shows that the optimal tax rate approaches one: a nearly 100 
percent income transfer from immobile factors to qualified labor.
26 Government cares about 
the provision of public goods as well as the consumption of a representative consumer, equa-
tion (23). An income transfer from one group to another group does not affect the consump-
tion as a whole, so governments can raise their utility by increasing taxes providing more 
public goods (i.e. higher research activity) while consumption expressed by a representative 
consumer remains unaffected. 
We therefore have to rearrange the state utility function in order to care for those who have to 
carry the tax burden. Remember that although all factor income groups get taxed, a redistribu-
tion of the tax revenue to factors employed in the R&D-sectors causes a real tax burden just 
for unqualified labor L. So equation (23) has to be changed to: 
i i
L i i L i i i C G C G WE
ψ ψ − =
1
, , ) , (        ( 2 7 )  
for i=1,2 and with  i i i i q Y a G / τ =  and  .  i
GDP
i i L i q Y a C / ) 1 ( , τ − =
 
The model in this chapter is described by the equations (1) to (22) as well as the state equation 
(27) and the migration condition (12.2). 
 
5.1. Symmetric Equilibrium: Prisoner’s Dilemma  
 
  We assume a symmetric equilibrium with equal industry shares and identical factor 
endowments in both countries, which is usually the case for high transportation costs. Fur-
thermore, countries do not have a primary interest to change the status quo. In order to set an 
optimal tax rate, governments maximize their utility functions taking the tax rate of the coun-
terpart as a constant. In general, governments can choose a cooperative or a non-cooperative 
way in doing so. If one of these two strategies leads to a Nash equilibrium, the corresponding 
tax rate as a market outcome will be observed. The resulting equilibrium might not be pareto-
efficient: although there is no incentive to deviate solely, there could be a solution resulting in 
higher utilities for both countries. This situation is best described by the prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
                                                 
26 See figure F2 in appendix f). 
  25In the first case, countries can cooperate and governments set identical tax rates. In doing so, 
there is no additional migration, equation (12.3), and therefore no change in industry shares. 
The status quo is being preserved and both countries remain symmetric. Figure 8 shows the 
development of state utility functions, equation (27), for tax rate values,  [ 1 , 0 ∈ a ] τ , consider-













      Figure 8: Cooperation: Government Taxing;  3 = τ  
The higher the preference for public goods in a country, the more to the right is the shift of the 
utility function: governments increase their utility (i.e. and the utility of the country) by higher 
tax rates providing more public goods. Hence, if there is a preference for a high research 
level,  , states have to increase taxes on income in order to finance R&D activity and to 
raise their utility. The peak of the utility functions corresponding to different preferences in 
figure 8 therefore characterize the optimal tax rate with the highest utility level, as shown 




i WE   * a τ  
0.1 40.018  0.11 
0.2 34.933  0.25 
0.3 33.962  0.43 
0.4 37.389  0.67 
0.5 54.503  0.99 
          Table 1: Cooperation: Optimal tax rates;    3 = τ
 
As a result, the optimal tax rate increases with stronger preference for public goods. But the 
public good preference should not be too high: reaching a value of 0.5 the resulting tax rate 
approaches one leaving no room for further analysis. 
  26Numerical simulation shows, that the optimal tax rates in table 1 are valid for different values 
of transport costs, but that the utility level increases the lower the transport costs are due to 
the decreasing prize index. 
 
Analyzing a non-cooperative situation, we concentrate on a preference value of  3 . 0 = ψ  and 
assume that both counterparts know their optimal tax rate and their resulting utility values if 
both would cooperate. A coordinated tax setting to be a stable Nash equilibrium demands that 
there is no incentive to deviate in order to achieve a higher utility. Fixing the tax rate of coun-
try 1 on the optimal value presented in table 1,  43 . 0
*
1 = a τ , and varying country’s 2 tax rate, 
[ 1 , 0 2 ∈ a ] τ , figure 9 shows a range of tax rate values with a higher utility for country 2 than 










   Figure  9:  Non-Cooperation: Strategic Tax-Setting;  3 = τ  
More precisely, the highest utility level,  , can be obtained for country 2 by 
setting a tax rate of  = 0.49. Comparing this with table 1 leads to the conclusion, that 










2 3 . 0
*
2 = = <
ψ ψ
dev WE WE ). This would result in a higher share of industry activity for country 2 
at country 1’s expense. 
 
Of course the same strategic behavior can be conceded to country 1. Hence, both countries 
would have an incentive to deviate from the coordinated solution taking the tax rate of the 
counterpart as a constant. This results in a non-coordinated symmetric Nash equilibrium, 
where both countries have the same industry and factor shares but a lower utility than in the 
coordinated strategy. Table 2 shows the prisoner’s dilemma in form of the utility values, 
:  2 1;WE WE
 
  27 Country 1 \ Country 2  2 a τ = 0.43  2 a τ = 0.49 
1 a τ = 0.43  33.962;33.962 33.597;34.147 
1 a τ = 0.49  34.147;33.597 33.783;33.783 
   Table 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma,  3 . 0 = ψ ; 3 = τ  
 
Proposition 5: Tax competition in a symmetric equilibrium results in an income tax 
rate that is too high from a social perspective: coordinated tax setting such as tax harmoniza-
tion would lead to lower income taxes and to higher state utilities. 
 
Proposition 5 remains valid for values of transport costs and public good preferences, which 
lead to a symmetric outcome and to a strategic tax setting.  
 
5.2. Agglomeration and Limited Tax Game 
 
  Considering a core periphery situation, the structurally backward country may have an 
incentive to gain industry shares from the industrialized country by setting a strategic tax rate. 
If this results in a higher tax yield relatively to the core country, offering higher wages leads 
qualified labor to inward migration and therefore to a higher research activity. Reducing or 
reversing the comparative advantage of the industrialized country of having a higher research 
level, firms begin to shift their production towards the structurally backward country. In doing 
so, they benefit not only from the increasing share of R&D activity, but also from the wage 
discrepancy. Hence, reinforcing circular processes, which were once responsible for the crea-
tion and development of the core periphery situation, would lead to a catch up of the structur-
ally backward country up to a reverse of the industrialization process. However, the core 
country could be aware of the strategic tax setting of its counterpart: it would choose its opti-
mal tax rate in order to offset the effects on migration and production outsourcing and to 
retain the core periphery situation. 
Following Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Baldwin et al. (2003), this results in a limited 
tax game: the core country sets its optimal tax rate,  1 a τ , in the first stage, the periphery coun-
try chooses its tax rate,  2 a τ , in the second stage. In the third stage, migration and production 
decision will be taken by the market participants until both economies reach steady state 
equilibria. 
Ignoring tax competition, industrialized countries are in general characterized by a higher tax 
burden than developing countries in order to finance public goods. This might be the result of 
  28a higher need and/or a higher preference of the public: rich voters tend to desire more public 
spending and are willing to carry a higher tax burden than poor voters in developing coun-
tries. Therefore, governments in rich countries have to consider a higher public good prefer-
ence while optimizing their tax rate stetting. As a result, the tax rate increases the higher the 
preference for public goods, see Table 1. To cover this fact, we have to assume that the core 




We assume an asymmetric equilibrium with industrial agglomeration in country 1 (i.e. a 
relative industry share of one,  ) and agricultural hinterland in country 2 ( ), which 
is usually the case when transportation costs are low. In solving this tax game, the last stage is 
solved first, followed by the first stage considering the beforehand solution: 
1 1 = s 0 2 = s
 
(1) The tax decision of country 2, equation (27), is solved first assuming the optimal 
tax rate of country 1 as given, 
*
1 2 a a τ τ . 
(2) Taking into account the solution derived in (1), country 1 tries to offset the effect 
of country 2’s strategic tax rate on migration and therefore on firm decision keep-
ing the migration condition unchanged, equation (12.3).  
 
As a benchmark, a cooperation situation as in the previous section is given, where countries 
do not have an interest in changing their status quo. Assuming different public good prefer-
ences for both countries, numerical simulation shows that each country sets its optimal tax 
rate   according to 
*
i a τ i ψ , as discussed in the symmetric case. Figure 10 shows state utility for 
3 . 0 1 = ψ  and  2 . 0 2 = ψ  while considering low transport costs,  1 . 1 = τ . The optimum for both 
countries under the condition of cooperation and maintaining the status quo can be reached by 
setting   and  , see also table 1.  43 . 0
*
1 = a τ 25 . 0
*
2 = a τ
                                                 
27 As shown in chapter 3, both the nominal and the real wages for unqualified labor are higher in the core than in 










   Figure  10:  Core-Periphery:  Coordination;  1 . 1 = τ  
Solving the tax game step (1) numerically and using the same parameter values as in figure 
10, country 2 takes the optimal tax rate of country 2 as a constant,  43 . 0
*
1 = a τ , and vary its tax 
rate in order to attract migration and provoke production outsourcing.
28 While figure 11.a) 
shows state utility, the absolute number of firms is shown in figure 11.b).  
 


















      Figure 11: Core-Periphery: Deviation of Country 2;  1 . 1 = τ  
Note that the utility function as well as the corresponding number of firms is discontinuous: 




2 = = a a
dev τ τ  massive inward migration of qualified labor
29 
leads to a dislocation of firms - figure 11.b) - attracting even more firms and qualified labor. 
As a result, the industrialization course is reversed with industrial agglomeration in country 2 
and agricultural production in country 1 (i.e.  0 1 = s  and  1 2 = s ). Although the highest utility 
level   for country 2 is at  , deviation by setting  99 , 44
*
2 = WE 19 . 0
*
2 = a τ 43 . 0 67 . 0
*
1 2 = = a a
dev τ τ  
                                                 
28 The whole range of tax rate values is shown in order to give full description of the impacts of deviation. 
However, only tax rates greater than   can lead to inward migration and therefore to a structural change 
of the status quo. 
25 . 0 *
2 = a τ
29 While there is a continuous flow of qualified labor from country 1 to country 2 as wages increase due to higher 
tax rates in country 2, reaching  results in a jump of inward migration.  *
2
dev a τ
  30and being industrialized would raise utility to  .
30 Hence, country 2 would 
prefer to raise its tax rate in order to get the core,  .  
42 . 46 2 =
dev WE
*
2 2 WE WE
dev >
Taking this into account, tax game step (2) is solved by country 1 in such a way that the effect 
of higher wage proposals offered by country 2 on migration decision is neutralized. In doing 
so, country 1 has to raise its tax rate in order to offer higher wages and to keep the migration 
condition unchanged. Equation (12.2) can be rearranged to: 
CP dev dev a a Ω − − = / ) 1 ( 1
*














H CP  as the real wage gap, where the core periphery equilibrium remains 






dev τ τ , country 1 has to be sure 
that there is no more incentive left for country 2 to an even higher tax rate: if not, country 1 
has to solve step (2) again, considering country 2’s new strategic tax rate. Step (2) will be 
repeated as long as country 2 gains the core and rises utility by increasing its tax rates, 
, or until country 1 finds it worthwhile to surrender the core and to rest on agri-
cultural production. Figure 12 shows the stylized decision problem for country 1.
31 
*
2 2 WE WE
dev >
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Figure 12: Tax Game: Decision Problem of Country 1  
The diagram in figure 12 reproduces the choices for country 2 in remaining underdeveloped 
(lower utility curve) or in gaining the core and being industrialized (upper utility curve). 
Country 1’s decision problem is such that it has to raise its tax rate to a level where country 2 
is indifferent between   as a strategic tax rate to get the core and   as an optimal tax 
rate to refrain from tax competition and to maintain the status quo. Having identified coun-




                                                 
2
30 At the same time as industry shares switches form country 1 to country 2, preferences for public goods have to 
be adjusted such that country 2, as being industrialized, counts with a higher preference towards public goods. 
Hence, WE  is calculated with  .  dev 3 . 0 2 = ψ
31 Note the difference to the model analyzed by Krugman and Baldwin (2004): in order to attract mobile factors, 
the periphery has to lower not to raise tax rates as discussed here.  
  31deviation, equation (28) determines the tax rate of country 1 in order to remain industrialized, 
. Finally, country 1 has to verify if it is worthwhile keeping the core: 
dev a1 τ
    ,                        (29) 
*
1 1 WE WE
dev ≥
where   corresponds to an optimal utility value imposed when being agricultural hinter-
land. If equation (29) is not fulfilled, country 1 would resign the core and set   producing 





Indeed, numerical simulations prove that country 1 has to raise tax rates from   to  in 
order to keep the core and to prevent country 2 from being industrialized taking into account 
equation (29). Hence, instead of deviation and engaging in the tax game, country 2 would rest 
on   as the best response to , see figure 11.
32 Additionally, as economies get closer (i.e. 
in terms of diminishing transportation costs), the core country has to increase its tax rate to a 








Proposition 6: Tax competition in a strategic tax game and further reduction of trans-
portation costs forces industrialized countries to increase their tax rates in order to maintain 




To summarize, industrialization can be solely attributed to firm and migration deci-
sions and is characterized by uneven economic development. In particular, spillover effects of 
regional R&D are crucial to the beginning and to the course of industrialization: the higher the 
respective applicability and transferability of research result, the greater the impact on the 
firm costs and therefore the higher the number of firms and products. Once industrialization 
has taken place, circular processes will lead to further economic development and will 
strengthen agglomerations.  
Relating to the example of the industrialization of the Asian Tigers in the last century, a con-
sequent pursuance of an export oriented policy combined with a unilateral opening for foreign 
imports was able to generate a sustainable economic development in that region
33. Beside 
high saving rates and educational spending, the spillover of foreign knowledge due to the use 
of imported intermediates and their adaptation in domestic production was decisive. Only by 
                                                 
32 See appendix e) for numerical results when considering the same assumptions as in figure 11. 
33Puga and Venables (1998, 1999) analyze the economic impacts of different trade policy. They conclude that a 
liberal trade policy is always preferable to a strategy of import substitution. 
  32increased trade and further international division of labor western industrialized countries 
were able to compensate their losses in the share of labor intensive production. The fastest 
economic development in South-East Asia was thereby achieved in the early phases of indus-
trialization (World Bank (1994)). The resulting stagnation period as predicted by the model 
can be seen in most developed countries in these days with no notable economic development 
and low growth rates. 
It turns out to be increasingly essential for developing countries to gain access to knowledge 
and human capital as well as research results to upgrade their local industries: the greater the 
access towards R&D and skilled labor, the higher the possibility for stronger participation in 
world markets and sustainable economic development. 
Increasing tax competition as a direct consequence of further economic integration forces 
countries to raise their taxes in order to keep the status quo and to prevent migration of skilled 
labor. If countries are equal in their industry shares, the outcome will be income tax rates that 
are too high from a social perspective. If not and in the case of a core periphery consideration, 
core countries may want to offset the effect of periphery’s strategic tax rate on production 
location and migration flows by raising their tax rates. Hence, in both cases the standard result 
of a “race to the bottom” does not apply. Moreover, tax rate-setting is not only constrained by 
tax competition but also by the extent of economic integration: as economies and markets get 
closer it may be worthwhile not to engage in strategic tax games and to set a socially opti-
mized tax rate. 
As outlined by Krugman and Baldwin (2004), during the first stages of European integration 
(1950-1970), average taxes were raised in all participating countries but to a higher extent by 
the industrialized core nations such as Germany or France than by the less industrialized 
Mediterranean countries or Ireland. It is hard to say whether increased economic integration 
and further political enlargement of the EU lead to tax harmonization within member coun-
tries. But the analysis shows, that at least for symmetric countries the adoption of common tax 
rates would be a desirable outcome in controlling migration flows. However, further analyses 
for political advise are required in order to confront the increasing migration pressure from 
poor to rich countries (Lundborg und Segerstrom (2002)) as well as the cutback of factor 
mobility restrictions (Ottaviano und Thisse (2002)). 
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  36Mathematical Appendix 
The derivation of equations for a two region model as well as further information related to 
numerical simulation will be given in the mathematical appendix. 
 




Each firm k faces the following decision making problem:  
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for i = 1, 2. The input vector z consist of  s i s i s i m L LA , , , + = ,   and  , the aggregate of 
intermediate goods is described by   and v is used as a vector for the 
individual shares:   and  . 
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  37Due to the assumption of symmetry, the individual shares of firm k will match with the sector 
specific shares in the optimum: 
Agriculture, s = R with   and constant scale economies:   0 = =
s s χ µ
    ,        ( a . 7 )  
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Price-Setting, Short Run Profits and Labor Demand 
The profit for an individual manufacturing firm k can be written as: 
U
k i k i k i k i k i k i
U
k i C p x p p x , , , , , , , ) ( ) , ( − = π       ( a . 1 0 )  
Each firm faces price competition. The first derivation of equation (a.10) due to the price, 
, will lead to the producer price:   k i
U




k i k i c p
ρ
= ,        ( a . 1 1 )  
where  ρ / 1  is a constant mark-up factor over marginal costs. Under consideration of equation 
(a.8) and the assumption, that in the long run equilibrium all manufacturing firms will set the 
same price, equation (a.11) can be rewritten to: 







U i i i i w q p ,                    (a.11.1) 
or for the case of fundamental research,  ρ β = ,to: 
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Substitution of equation (a.8) and (a.11.1) into (a.10), the condition for short run profits can 
be described as:  
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The aggregate demand for unqualified work in sector U will be obtained by differentiating the 
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The demand for qualified work will be financed through lump sum income taxation: 
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With consideration of total income:  
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equation (a.14) can be rewritten to:  
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b.)  Decision Making of a Representative Consumer 
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  39The optimal budget allocation relative to consumption goods of one sector, s = z, can be 
stated as: 






i d Y a VU q / ) 1 ( γ τ − =























) ( ) 1 (
γ
γ
τ .       ( b . 3 )  
In the optimum the individual shares will match with the sector specific shares,  . 
Normalizing the price of the agricultural output to one,  , the indirect utility function can 
be written as: 




  ,                      (b.3.1) 
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as the disposable income.  
 
c.) General  Equilibrium 
 
Due to the assumption of increasing returns, each good is solely produced by a unique firm in 
one region, whereas demand will be in both regions. Total demand of consumers and produc-
ers for good z produced in Region j can be stated as: 
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for j = 1, 2.  
 
Demand of Producers  
As derived for the optimization problem of manufacturing firms, a share of µCj  is used for 
the purchase of the intermediate aggregate: 
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with  : each producer sets the same price in a steady state equilibrium.  j j j j p h p , , ) ( =
 
  40Demand of Consumers 
As derived for the optimization problem of representative consumer, a share of income γ  is 
used for the purchase of the manufacturing goods:  
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Total Demand 
Substituting the two optimization solutions from equation set (c.2) and (c.3),   and 
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as the cumulative expenditures of good z. 
 
Under consideration of equation (b.4) and (a.15), equation (c.6) can be rewritten as:  
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There will be no transportation costs within regions,  1 , = i i τ . Equation (c.4) therefore is: 
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for  i j ≠  and  for i= 1, 2.  i i i C Y a e µ τ γ + − = ) 1 (
 
d.)   Symmetric Equilibrium Shares of Unqualified Labor  
 
Considering a steady state equilibrium, equations (a.13.1) can be sated as 
. Normalizing   and  ()
bep
U U npx w L µ − = 1 1 =
bep x 0 = π , the symmetric equilibrium share of 
workers employed in agriculture and industry can be calculated by substitution of equation 
(a.13.1) into equation (c.6.2), (c.5.1) and (c.4.1). This leads to:  
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After substitution of equation (d.1) and equation (d.2) into equation (d.3), the condition for 
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The economy will be in a stable equilibrium when the nominal wage in the agriculture sector, 
, matches with equation (d.4). This leads to: 
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  42e.)   Government Taxation and Tax Competition  
 
Optimal Tax Rate-Setting: Without International Migration 
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under the assumption of no international factor mobility, this leads to: 
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Rearranging equation (e.2), it turns out that the first best tax rate equals public good prefer-
ence: 
() 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (














1 = + − −
− ψ ψ ψτ i a , 
ψ τ = i a .          (e.3) 
 
Optimal Tax Rate-Setting: With International Migration 





, and therefore 
on state utility, equation (23), differentiation of   
at the supposed symmetric equilibrium yields to:  
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A further look on equation (e.4) leads to the following conclusions:  
(1)  Z>0: a tax increase leads to an inflow of qualified labor and by equation (6) in combi-
nation with equation (8) or (8.1) to a higher research level and hence to a higher number of 
firms, equation (22). The sign of Z is therefore positive. 




w d U  a higher number of firms results in higher demand of unqualified labor, 
equation (16), and therefore in a higher wage rate. The sign of this term is also positive.  








R a higher number of firms results in a higher share of unqualified 
labor employed in manufacture and in a loss of labor shares in agriculture,  . The 
effect on the agricultural profit rate per unit land,  , is negative because of the resulting 
higher wages in agriculture, equation (1.1). 
U R L L L − =
) ( R w r
(4)  0 <
dn
dq
: a higher number of firms decrease the price index, equation (14). 






m WH ε : when all other things equal, a one percent increase in skilled 
labor decreases wage rates by one percent. 




: a tax increase raises the incentive to migrate, equation (12) in combination 
with equation (7). 
 
The last two statements (5) and (6) will be derived analytically: 




















by the use of equation (7), rkK aY m wH − =τ . Re-substitution of equation (7) yields to:  
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(6)    Total differentiation of the migration condition, equation (12.3), using two sub-
functions,  1 ] [ a a f τ τ =  and 
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mathematical substitute, equation (e.5) can be written to:  
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 is positive and 
therefore the sign of  a d dWE τ / : the first best solution,  ψ τ = a , cannot be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Numerical Results for the Limited Tax Game:  
Assuming  3 . 0 1 = ψ  and  2 . 0 2 = ψ  as well as  1 . 1 = τ , Table e.1) present numerical results for 
country 1’s decision problem assuming: 
 
1 . 1 = τ   Step  (1)  Step  (1)  Step  (1)    
  No Deviation Deviation  No Deviation Deviation No Deviation Deviation  Solution 
1 a τ   0.43  0,43  0.44676 0.44676 0.46405 0.46405  0.46405 
2 a τ   0.19 0.67 0.19 0.69 0.19 0.72  0.19 
1 WE   51.814 41.866 51.911 41.414 51.962 40.954  51.962 
2 WE   44.985 46.419  45.09  45.647 45.194 44.402  45.194 
Table e.1: Decision Problem of Country 1 
 
As mentioned, in setting  43 . 0 67 . 0
*
1 2 = = a a
dev τ τ country 2 could gain the core, reach a higher 
utility level than to remain underdeveloped,  , and leave 
country 1 as an agricultural hinterland.  Hence, equation (28) indicate, that country 1 have to 
set   in order to offset the effect on migration, but leaving room to country 2 for 
further deviation by setting  
985 . 44 419 . 46
*
2 2 = > = WE WE
dev
447 , 0 1 =
dev a τ
447 . 0 69 . 0 1 2 = =
dev dev a a τ τ . Again, country 2 would choose to 
deviate and would still be better off,  . Repeating tax game 
step (2) leads to   as an optimal response for country 1 and to an end of the tax 
game:  country 2 could still get the core by 
09 . 45 647 . 45
*
2 2 = > = WE WE
dev
464 , 0 1 =
dev a τ
464 . 0 72 . 0 1 2 = =
dev dev a a τ τ  but being industrialized 
  45would lead to a lower utility than to abstain from strategic tax setting and to rest on 
,  . Therefore, if country 1 sets in the first stage 
, country 2 has in the second stage no more incentive to deviate. Finally, the 
established solution has to comply with equation (29) in order to be reasonable outcome: in 
fact, its worthwhile for country 1 to engage in strategic tax-setting and to remain industrial-
ized, because state utility for country 1 in case of deviation of country 2 and losing the core is 
always lower than  . 
19 . 0
*
2 = a τ 194 . 45 402 . 44
*
2 2 = < = WE WE
dev
464 , 0 1 =
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Figure F1: Fundamental research; Tomahawk-bifurcation 
 
















  46g.)   Numerical Simulation and the Choice of Parameters 
 
The numerical simulation was calculated in Gauss and can be requested. The parameters were 
set to  6 . 0 = µ ,  6 = σ ,  6 . 0 = ι , 3 . 0 = γ  and  8 . 0 = θ . In the case of fundamental the parameter 
i β  is normalized to  σ σ ρ β / ) 1 ( − = = i . The technology parameter for the R&D sector was 
set for fundamental research to A=4 and for secondary research to A=3.2. The elasticity of the 











. The spillover effect is measured 
by .  [] 1 , 0 ∈ Γ
Respectively to the numerical simulation, the same methodology is used as mentioned in Puga 
(1998, 1999): based on prior determined number of operating firms  , the price index   
and nominal wages   of unqualified labor can be calculated for a short run equilibrium. On 
the same time the share of qualified and unqualified work in manufacture,   and  , in 
both countries and sectors can be determined. Subsequently the number of firms is varied as 
long as equation (20) is satisfied: in a long run equilibrium there will be no further incentive 
for firms to fluctuate and labor to migrate. Respectively to government taxation and tax com-
petition in chapter 4, tax rates are set first, followed by migration and production decision 
taken by market participants until economies reach steady state equilibria. 
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